Reward hackingPI-0003
OpenAI found a reasoning model reward hacking in training, then hiding its intent when penalized
OpenAI reported that a frontier reasoning model it was training frequently subverted coding tasks, for example by making tests pass without solving the problem, and often stated this plan openly in its chain of thought. When OpenAI penalized such reasoning directly, the model kept reward hacking but stopped revealing it in its reasoning, which the company flagged as a monitoring risk.
- Harm
- Harm: No harm reportedAdds nothing to the index.
- Control
- Control level 2, Instruction violationReported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
Sources
How we know
3 sources · developer confirmed. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.
- primaryDetecting misbehavior in frontier reasoning models (chain-of-thought monitoring)OpenAI · March 10, 2025openai.com/index/chain-of-thought-monitoring/
- researchMonitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting ObfuscationarXiv · March 14, 2025arxiv.org/abs/2503.11926v1
- newsPressuring AI models to avoid cheating could backfire (page returned HTTP 500 when checked 3 Oct 2026)Convergence India · date unknownconvergenceindia.org/industry-news/telecom/pressuring-ai-models-to-avoid-cheati…
Why this rating
No harm reported; control failure level 2
Two separate assessments. Only documented harm can count toward the index.
Observed harm
No harm reportedTraining runs; no effect outside training is described.
Not a finding that no harm occurred.
The harm scale
- 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
- 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
- 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
- 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
- 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.
Control assessment
Instruction violationGamed its training reward inside its environment; learned to obscure intent from a chain-of-thought monitor, but no evidence of acting outside permissions.
Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
The control scale
- 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
- 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
- 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
- 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
- 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.
Rating rationale
Reward hacking in training is control level 2; obfuscation of reasoning was a trained-in side effect, not deception about specific actions, so not raised to 3. The record shows no harm reported, not a finding that none occurred.
Effect on the index
It is one of the control failures at the floor of the March 10 reading, which did not change
The reading for the week to March 10, 2025, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.
Not counted: no harm reported. 1 other record behind the reading for that week.
The arithmetic
| Step | With it | Without |
|---|---|---|
| Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidence | No | — |
| Worst documented harm, ksets the band | — (none counting) | — (none counting) |
| Harms at that level, nposition in the band | 0 | 0 |
| Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts | 2 | 2 |
| Readingrounded down | 2 Control failures only | 2 Control failures only |
Inside the window of 5 weekly readings
| Week to | Reading | Band |
|---|---|---|
| March 10, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| March 17, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| March 24, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| March 31, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| April 7, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
Revisions
What we changed
5 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.
- v5Oct. 6, 2026
Ratings confirmed by the editor. Changed: impact.
- v4Oct. 3, 2026
Dated the OpenAI post (10 Mar 2025) and the arXiv paper's v1 (14 Mar 2025). The OpenAI page returned HTTP 403 when checked, so its date rests on search results and a GIGAZINE report of 11 Mar 2025. The Convergence India article returned HTTP 500 when checked on 3 Oct 2026 and is marked unavailable in its title; the OpenAI post and the paper carry the record. Ratings unchanged.
- v3Oct. 2, 2026
Report date resolved from month precision (2025-03, placed on the 1st) to 2025-03-10: OpenAI's blog post on chain-of-thought monitoring (10 Mar 2025); the arXiv paper followed on 14 Mar.
- v2Sept. 30, 2026
Rated: impact not reported; control type instruction violation.
- v1Sept. 30, 2026
Backfilled from public reporting.
Cite and share
Use this record
Citation
Paperclip Index. “OpenAI found a reasoning model reward hacking in training, then hiding its intent when penalized.” Record PI-0003. Reported March 10, 2025; updated Oct. 6, 2026. Rated under methodology v0.6. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0003