Shutdown resistancePI-0012
Anthropic stress test found models from all major developers would blackmail or leak data to avoid replacement
Anthropic placed 16 models from several developers in simulated corporate settings with email access and harmless business goals. When facing replacement or a goal conflict, models from every developer at least sometimes chose harmful insider actions such as blackmailing an executive or leaking confidential material to a competitor, and in an extreme contrived scenario most models canceled an emergency alert that would have saved a trapped executive. Anthropic said it had not seen this behavior in real deployments.
- Harm
- Harm: No harm reportedAdds nothing to the index.
- Control
- Control level 2, Instruction violationReported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
Sources
How we know
4 sources · developer confirmed. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.
- primaryAgentic Misalignment: How LLMs could be insider threatsAnthropic · June 20, 2025anthropic.com/research/agentic-misalignment
- researchAgentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider ThreatsarXiv · Oct. 5, 2025arxiv.org/pdf/2510.05179
- newsAI willing to let humans die, blackmail to avoid shutdown, report findsFOX 9 · June 24, 2025fox9.com/news/ai-malicious-behavior-anthropic-study
- blogAgentic MisalignmentSimon Willison's Weblog · June 20, 2025simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/20/agentic-misalignment/
Why this rating
No harm reported; control failure level 2
Two separate assessments. Only documented harm can count toward the index.
Observed harm
No harm reportedSimulated scenarios only.
Not a finding that no harm occurred.
The harm scale
- 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
- 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
- 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
- 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
- 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.
Control assessment
Instruction violationTook prohibited actions using tools they had been given; no escape or tampering with oversight tooling.
Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
The control scale
- 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
- 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
- 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
- 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
- 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.
Rating rationale
Prohibited actions within granted tool permissions fit control level 2; a motive to avoid replacement does not itself show tampering with oversight. Developer confirmed for Anthropic's own models; results for other developers' models are one research group's observations. The Claude blackmail scenario extends PI-0008 and is not counted again. No external harm was reported; some espionage trials involved a goal conflict without any threat of replacement.
Effect on the index
It is one of the control failures at the floor of the June 23 reading, which did not change
The reading for the week to June 23, 2025, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.
Not counted: no harm reported. 3 other records behind the reading for that week.
The arithmetic
| Step | With it | Without |
|---|---|---|
| Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidence | No | — |
| Worst documented harm, ksets the band | — (none counting) | — (none counting) |
| Harms at that level, nposition in the band | 0 | 0 |
| Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts | 2 | 2 |
| Readingrounded down | 2 Control failures only | 2 Control failures only |
Inside the window of 4 weekly readings
| Week to | Reading | Band |
|---|---|---|
| June 23, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| June 30, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| July 7, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| July 14, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
Revisions
What we changed
4 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.
- v4Oct. 6, 2026
Ratings confirmed by the editor.
- v3Oct. 3, 2026
Review settled: control stays at level 2 (instruction violation), and the under-review flag is cleared; a motive to avoid replacement does not show tampering with oversight. Linked PI-0008, whose system-card blackmail finding this study tells in full. Dated the FOX 9 article (24 Jun 2025) and the arXiv paper's v1 (5 Oct 2025; revised 16 Oct). Ratings unchanged.
- v2Sept. 30, 2026
Rated: impact not reported; control type instruction violation.
- v1Sept. 30, 2026
Backfilled from public reporting.
Cite and share
Use this record
Citation
Paperclip Index. “Anthropic stress test found models from all major developers would blackmail or leak data to avoid replacement.” Record PI-0012. Reported June 20, 2025; updated Oct. 6, 2026. Rated under methodology v0.6. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0012