Hijacked by injectionPI-0031
CamoLeak: hidden pull-request comments made GitHub Copilot Chat leak private code and secrets
A Legit Security researcher showed that instructions hidden in invisible markdown comments in a pull request could make GitHub Copilot Chat search the victim's private repositories and leak secrets and source code one character at a time through GitHub's own image proxy. According to Legit Security, GitHub closed the route on Aug. 14, 2025, by disabling image rendering in Copilot Chat, after a June report through HackerOne; the researcher used his own private repositories, and details were published on Oct. 8
- Harm
- Harm: No harm reportedAdds nothing to the index.
- Control
- Control level 2, Instruction violationReported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
Near miss. Harm was plausible but prevented. It is rated only on what actually happened.
Sources
How we know
3 sources · single source. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.
- researchCamoLeak: Critical GitHub Copilot vulnerability leaks private source codeLegit Security · Oct. 8, 2025legitsecurity.com/blog/camoleak-critical-github-copilot-vulnerability-leaks-pri…
- newsGitHub Copilot Chat turns blabbermouth with crafty prompt injection attackThe Register · Oct. 9, 2025theregister.com/2025/10/09/github_copilot_chat_vulnerability/
- newsGitHub Copilot 'CamoLeak' AI Attack Exfiltrates DataDark Reading · Oct. 9, 2025darkreading.com/application-security/github-copilot-camoleak-ai-attack-exfils-d…
Why this rating
No harm reported; control failure level 2
Two separate assessments. Only documented harm can count toward the index.
Observed harm
No harm reportedResearcher demonstration on controlled accounts; no victims reported.
Not a finding that no harm occurred.
The harm scale
- 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
- 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
- 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
- 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
- 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.
Control assessment
Instruction violationCopilot Chat acted with the signed-in user's permissions on injected instructions.
Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
The control scale
- 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
- 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
- 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
- 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
- 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.
Rating rationale
No external harm was reported from this controlled test. Control remains level 2. This is a near miss.
Effect on the index
It does not count toward the Oct. 13 reading
The reading for the week to Oct. 13, 2025, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.
Not counted: no harm reported. 4 other records behind the reading for that week.
The arithmetic
| Step | With it | Without |
|---|---|---|
| Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidence | No | — |
| Worst documented harm, ksets the band | — (none counting) | — (none counting) |
| Harms at that level, nposition in the band | 0 | 0 |
| Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts | 3 | 3 |
| Readingrounded down | 3 Control failures only | 3 Control failures only |
Inside the window of 4 weekly readings
| Week to | Reading | Band |
|---|---|---|
| Oct. 13, 2025 | 3 | Control failures only |
| Oct. 20, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| Oct. 27, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| Nov. 3, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
Revisions
What we changed
4 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.
- v4Oct. 6, 2026
Ratings confirmed by the editor.
- v3Oct. 3, 2026
Audit corrections. Verification changed from Multiple credible sources to Single source, with a research evidence review: The Register and Dark Reading report Legit Security's research, and GitHub did not respond. Report date moved from 2025-10-09 to 2025-10-08, when Legit published. Dated the Legit and Dark Reading sources (Dark Reading's date is from the audit; the page was not readable in the Oct 2026 check), used canonical URLs, and added a status note. Ratings unchanged.
- v2Sept. 30, 2026
Rated: impact not reported; control type instruction violation.
- v1Sept. 30, 2026
Backfilled from public reporting.
Cite and share
Use this record
Citation
Paperclip Index. “CamoLeak: hidden pull-request comments made GitHub Copilot Chat leak private code and secrets.” Record PI-0031. Reported Oct. 8, 2025; updated Oct. 6, 2026. Rated under methodology v0.6. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0031