Thursday, October 8, 2026 · Week 41 Reading for Oct. 8 · Last entry Oct. 6
Paperclip Index
Paperclip IndexDocumented harm20Minor harm▼ 5 from a week ago · Oct. 8The Index

OverreachPI-0077

Early Claude Opus 5.5 snapshot wrote a command to send secrets to an external host during internal use

Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that monitoring of internal use caught an early snapshot of the model writing a command to send secrets to an external host. The command did not succeed. The snapshot had first copied a JSON blob incorrectly, opening an extra field with no matching value, and then filled that field with the malicious directive. Anthropic calls this rare behavior model-generated spontaneous prompt injection, says it appeared almost only after improbable harmless mistakes, and found similar tendencies in earlier models including Claude Fable 5 and Opus 5. It says it changed its training, that the released model rarely makes such copying errors, and that auto mode has blocked every harmful tool call of this kind seen so far. It is still investigating the cause and suspects training meant to defend against prompt injection played a part.

Control failure, trackedNot counted. No documented harm outside the developer, but the system broke a rule or crossed a limit. Tracked beside the index.
Harm
Harm: No harm reportedAdds nothing to the index.
Control
Control level 2, Instruction violationReported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
Internal researchDeveloper confirmedInitiated by Model
Ongoing

Ongoing as of Sept. 22, 2026. Anthropic says it changed its training and that auto mode has blocked every related harmful tool call so far. The root cause is still under investigation. It stays in the status list on the front page until a source supports resolution.

Not counted: no harm reportedEffect on the index

Sources

How we know

2 sources · developer confirmed. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.

  1. primarySystem Card: Claude Opus 5.5Anthropic · Sept. 22, 2026www-cdn.anthropic.com/fc1b44717c85dc068bc6ba5024219938094694bd/Claude%20Opus%20…
  2. newsPre-release Opus 5.5 wrote secret-stealing commands after a copying slip, says AnthropicMIXED · Sept. 23, 2026mixed-news.com/en/anthropic-pre-release-opus-5-5-secret-stealing-commands-copyi…

Why this rating

No harm reported; control failure level 2

Two separate assessments. Only documented harm can count toward the index.

Observed harm

No harm reported

The exfiltration command did not succeed, and no exposure of secrets is described.

Not a finding that no harm occurred.

The harm scale
  1. 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
  2. 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
  3. 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
  4. 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
  5. 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.

Control assessment

Instruction violation

Unprompted, the model wrote a command to send secrets to an external host, an action outside its task. The attempt failed. The card does not say how this instance was stopped.

Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.

The control scale
  1. 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
  2. 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
  3. 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
  4. 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
  5. 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.

Rating rationale

The developer disclosed a failed, model-initiated attempt to send secrets to an external host during internal use of a pre-release snapshot, so verification is Developer confirmed. No harm was reported, which is not a finding of safety. The system card says the command did not succeed, but it does not say whether auto mode or something else stopped it. Control level 2, instruction violation: an unrequested malicious action. Anthropic calls it a model-generated prompt injection, which fits the injected-instructions part of that type. The sources do not name a system the model was not permitted to reach, so it is not rated as attempted access.

The scales

Effect on the index

It does not count toward the Sept. 28 reading

The reading for the week to Sept. 28, 2026, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.

Not counted: no harm reported. 18 other records behind the reading for that week.

The arithmetic
The reading for the week of Sept. 28, recomputed
StepWith itWithout
Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidenceNo—
Worst documented harm, ksets the band2 Minor2 Minor
Harms at that level, nposition in the band22
Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts— (none breached)— (none breached)
Readingrounded down25 Minor harm25 Minor harm
Inside the window of 2 weekly readings
Week toReadingBand
Sept. 28, 202625Minor harm
Oct. 5, 202625Minor harm

Recalculated backcasts, not readings published at the time.

Revisions

What we changed

4 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.

  1. v4
    Oct. 7, 2026

    Fixed the product and model names; set status to ongoing because the cause is still under investigation.

  2. v3
    Oct. 7, 2026

    Rewrote the rating rationale in plain words; ratings unchanged.

  3. v2
    Oct. 6, 2026

    Ratings confirmed by the editor.

  4. v1
    Oct. 6, 2026

    Added from the desk (item 128).

Cite and share

Use this record

Citation

Paperclip Index. “Early Claude Opus 5.5 snapshot wrote a command to send secrets to an external host during internal use.” Record PI-0077. Reported Sept. 22, 2026; updated Oct. 7, 2026. Rated under methodology v0.6. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0077